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Forthcoming in, EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM: COPYRIGHT THIS CENTURY (Susy Frankel and 
Daniel Gervais, eds. 2013) 
 









It has been suggested that today’s authors need copyright 
exceptions and limitations more than they need exclusive rights. I 
will first test the proposition by examining what one might call 
authorship-oriented exceptions, from ‘fair abridgement’ in early 
English cases to the original meaning of ‘transformative use’ in 
the U.S. fair use doctrine.  All of these exceptions trained on the 
promotion of creativity by allowing authors to make reasonable 
borrowings from old works in the creation of new ones.  I conclude 
that both today’s assemblers of ‘remixes’ and yesterday’s 
traditional creators of works of entertainment or scholarship have 
needed the flexibility with which these kinds of exceptions temper 
exclusive rights. 
 
Next I will examine the bolder proposition that, compared with 
their need for limitations on copyright, authors today neither 
desire nor require exclusive rights.  The claim suggests that 
today’s authors do not (or should not) seek to make a living from 
or control the exploitation of their creations.  Behind the belittling 
of exclusive rights there loom significant business interests built on 
the expansion of copyright exceptions.  The exceptions in question 
do not foster creativity, they redistribute the fruits of creativity.  
They are authorship-undermining exceptions because their 
justification increasingly relies on the denigration of proprietary 
authorship. 
 
It has long been popular to point out that the romantic author has 
long been a front for unromantic, unlovable copyright industries, 
from the booksellers of the eighteenth century to the MPAA and 
RIAA of today. I would like to suggest that today’s counterpart – 
or antidote? – to the romantic author, the techno postmodernist 
participant, is also a shill for big industry.  The 
instrumentalization of the author, or of the anti-author, still serves 
big business, it’s just that the business consumes copyrighted 
works, rather than produces them. 
  
                                                 
*
 Many thanks to John Briggs and Philip Sancilio, both Columbia Law School class of 2013.  







A lawyer for an immense copyright-exploiting corporation, casting himself as a defender 
of authors’ rights, challenged his interlocutor’s incredulity with the following assertion: given 
today’s diversity of authors, ‘more of them depend on limitations and exceptions than on 
exclusive rights’.  Some of you might cringe at the resemblance of this credo to Orwell’s 
‘Freedom is Slavery!’
1
  Nonetheless I’d like to take seriously the proposition that today’s authors 
need copyright exceptions and limitations more than they need exclusive rights. 
 
First, I will test the proposition by examining what one might call authorship-oriented 
exceptions, from ‘fair abridgement’ in early English cases to the original meaning of 
‘transformative use’ in the U.S. fair use doctrine.  All of these exceptions trained on the 
promotion of creativity by allowing authors to make reasonable borrowings from old works in 
the creation of new ones.  I conclude that both today’s assemblers of ‘remixes’ and yesterday’s 
traditional creators of works of entertainment or scholarship have needed the flexibility with 
which these kinds of exceptions temper exclusive rights. 
 
Next I will examine the bolder proposition that, compared with their need for limitations 
on copyright, authors today neither desire nor require exclusive rights.  The claim suggests that 
today’s authors do not (or should not) seek to make a living from or control the exploitation of 
their creations. Or, in the words of the same Orwellian advocate, ‘Copyright is not interested in 
people making a living, it’s interested in promoting creativity’.
2
  - As if creations will 
spontaneously sprout in even the most nutrient-starved soil.  Of course, the Internet did not 
inaugurate the celebration of altruistic or amateur authorship.  Genteel contempt for professional 
(that is, money-grubbing) authors predates the Statute of Anne.
3
  But today’s variation on the 
theme betrays more than social snobbery.  Behind the belittling of exclusive rights there loom 
significant business interests built on the expansion of copyright exceptions.  The exceptions in 
question do not foster creativity, they redistribute the fruits of creativity.  They are authorship-
undermining exceptions because their justification increasingly relies on the denigration of 
proprietary authorship.  
 
I 
Let’s commence with traditional, authorship-oriented exceptions, beginning with 
eighteenth-century Britain.  In a series of cases starting from 1720, the English courts developed 
what came to be known as the ‘fair abridgement’ exception to copyright infringement.  For 
example, Gyles v. Wilcox, decided in 1740, concerned condensed versions of law books; Lord 
Chancellor Hardwicke offered one of the doctrine’s more celebrated expressions: ‘abridgements 
may with great propriety be called a new book, because ... the invention, learning, and judgment 
                                                 
1
 E.g., G. Orwell, 1984 (New York, NY: Signet Classic, 1949), 4. 
2
 E. McDermott, ‘The Great Copyright Debate’, Managing Intellectual Property (Mar. 2009), 30 (quoting Fred Von 
Lohmann, then of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, now a senior copyright counsel at Google). 
3
 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19.  See, e.g., Nicolas Boileau Despreaux, L’Art poétque (1674) (D. Nichol Smith, ed., 1931, p. 
33) decrying those authors who ‘disgusted with glory and famished for gain/ indenture their muse to a bookseller/ 
and convert a divine art into a mercenary trade’ (‘je ne puis souffrir ces auteurs renommés,/ Qui, dégoûtés de gloire 
et d’argent affamés,/ Mettent leur Apollon aux gages d’un libraire,/ Et font d’un art divin un métier mercenaire.’) 
3 
 
of the author is shewn in them, and in many cases are extremely useful.’
4
 Even at this early date 
we recognize a familiar dual preoccupation, to permit the continued circulation of ‘extremely 
useful’ works by follow-on creators, and to emphasize the authorship contributions of the 
second-comer whose alterations of the underlying work demonstrate ‘invention, learning and 
judgment’. 
 
Even more famously, in 1785 in Sayre v. Moore, a case about sea charts, Lord Mansfield 
reiterated the importance of the second work’s utility, but balanced it against the economic 
interests of the first author: 
 
we must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that 
men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, 
may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of ingenuity and labor; 
the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress 




Or Lord Ellenborough, who in 1802 in Cary v. Kearsley, concerning a book of road 
maps, declared, ‘while I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his 
copy-right, one must not put manacles on science’.
6
  Five years later, however, in Roworth v. 
Wilkes he abandoned the manacling metaphor and concentrated on the market impact of failing 
to secure the enjoyment of copyright: ‘the question is, whether the defendant’s publication [an 
encyclopedia] would serve as a substitute for [the plaintiff’s treatise].’
7
  Substitution, moreover, 
was not to be ascertained merely by counting pages, as Lord Chancellor Cottenham cautioned in 
1836 in Bramwell v. Halcomb: ‘One writer might take all the vital part of another’s book, though 





In the US in 1841 in Folsom v. Marsh, which concerned a biography of George 
Washington, Justice Story summed up over a hundred years of English authority, restating the 
fair abridgement doctrine as follows: 
 
It is clear, that a mere selection, or different arrangement of parts of the original 
work, so as to bring the work into a smaller compass, will not be held to be [a 
noninfringing] abridgment. There must be real, substantial condensation of the 
materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely 
the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the 




                                                 
4
 (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490; 2 Atk. 141, 143. 
5
 (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.(b), 140 n.(b); 1 East 361 n.(b). 
6
 (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680; 4 Esp. 168, 170. 
7
 (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889, 891; 1 Camp. 94, 98. 
8
 (1836) 40 Eng. Rep. 1110, 1110; 3 My. & Cr. 737, 738.  For a fuller analysis of the English decisions, see Isabella 
Alexander, Copyright and the Public Interest in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
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... If so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the 
labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated 
by another, that is sufficient … to constitute a piracy ... In short, we must often, in 
deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the selections 
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the 





These case law examples, particularly as synthesized by Justice Story, reveal the basic 
moving parts of the traditional fair use doctrine: authorship, public benefit, economic impact.  
The progress of learning advances when the law allows follow-on authors to bestow their 
intellectual labour and judgment in reworking selections from a prior work, without prejudicing 
the profits or prospects of that work. 
 
The US 1976 Copyright Act largely codifies Justice Story’s restatement.  Section 107 
instructs courts to assess four factors: 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
 





The factors imply that something less than the whole prior work (‘portion used’) will be taken 
(though, as we will see, US courts have overcome this apparent restriction).  The examples set 
out in § 107’s preamble, moreover, generally point to new authorship uses: ‘criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research.’
11
  The outlier is classroom copies, though these arguably fall under a special regime 
because the 1976 Act also anticipated the promulgation of guidelines on classroom 
photocopying, and appointed a commission representing interested parties to develop them.
12
  
The other examples all come within what used to be called ‘productive use’ that yields new 
works.
13
  In an influential article written in 1990, Judge Pierre Leval of the US Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit – which sits in NYC and hears a lot of copyright cases – redubbed this 
                                                 
9
 9 F. Cas. 342, 345, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
10




 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66–72 (1976) (‘Chairman Kastenmeier and other members urged the parties to meet 
together independently in an effort to achieve a meeting of the minds as to permissible educational uses of 
copyrighted material. The response to these suggestions was positive, and a number of meetings ... were held 
beginning in September 1975.’). 
13





 and the Supreme Court, four years later, for the first time 
recognizing parody as a potential fair use, adopted the label.
15
  In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., the Supreme Court inquired whether the defendants’ musical parody had made a 
‘transformative’ use: not one that merely supersedes the objects of the earlier work by copying it, 
but one that ‘adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 




US fair use cases involving follow-on authorship largely turn on the ‘transformative’ 
character of the contribution, as well as on economic impact, though courts sometimes conflate 
the two factors: courts tend to equate ‘transformative’ works or purposes with those that do not 
substitute for the copyright owner’s normal markets for the work.
17
  Indeed, the Second Circuit 
has even coined the term ‘transformative market’, apparently meaning an exploitation that falls 
outside the copyright owner’s zone of exclusivity.
18
  The counterpoint to a ‘transformative 
market’ (favoring fair use) is ‘a traditional license market’, that is, a ‘traditional, reasonable, or 
likely to be developed market’ (disfavoring fair use).
19
  Courts inquire into whether the plaintiff 
is currently exploiting the market, or whether the market is one that similarly situated copyright 
owners would normally exploit.
20
  Thus, the traditional fair use inquiry balances the new 
expressive use (promoting the second-comer’s authorship) against the first author’s returns for 
her intellectual labours.  The public interest advances through care for the second author and 
feeding of the first.  Traditional fair use promotes an ecosystem of authorship. 
 
That ecosystem moreover accommodates non-traditional authorship.  The apostles of 
‘remix’ (from whom we’ll hear more later) decry copyright for oh-so-yesterday consecration of 
tyrannical romantic authors whose works impose ‘discursive hegemony,’
21
 ‘narrowing the rights 
of imitation and appropriation.’
22
  But fair use makes room for a great deal of secondary 
creativity, so long as it does not unreasonably compromise the first author’s exploitation of 
paying markets for her work.  In some cases, it’s clear from the nature of the work that there’s no 
serious prospect of competition – think of all the parodies on YouTube of the Hitler Bunker 
                                                 
14
 P. N. Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’, Harvard Law Review, 103 (1990), 1111 (‘I believe the answer to the 
question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.’). 
15




 See, e.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2009); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
18
 Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 145 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998) (‘[C]opyright owners may not 
preempt exploitation of transformative markets, which they would not in general develop or license others to 
develop ...’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
19
 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994). 
20
 Cf., e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp.2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (‘[T]he Second Circuit has previously 
emphasized that it is the “potential market” for the copyrighted work and its derivatives that must be examined ...’), 
vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); Castle Rock Entm’t, 150 F.3d at 145–6 (‘Although Castle 
Rock has evidenced little if any interest in exploiting this market for derivative works based on Seinfeld ... the 
copyright law must respect that creative and economic choice.’). 
21
 M. Sunder, ‘IP
3
’, Stanford Law Review, 59 (2006), 305. 
22
 H. Travis, ‘Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment’, Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, 15 (2000), 827. 
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scene from the film Downfall (including a parody of Hitler Bunker scene parodies).
23
  In other 
cases, the work might fall within traditional copyright markets, such as sequels of novels or 
films, but the dissemination, even if potentially widespread, is low-grade and effectively 
noncommercial
24
 – think of fan fiction.  Or more specifically, think of Harry Potter; the 
Harrypotterfanfiction.com site alone boasts (as of February 2013) almost 36,000 authors of over 
79,000 HP stories.
25
  I’ll pass on the public benefit prong, but these are expressive uses whose 
economic impact is too trivial to warrant a finding of infringement.  (Nor to warrant alienating 
the fan base.)  Authorship may, as Peter Jaszi predicted in the paleolithic 1990s, be becoming 
‘polyvocal’, ‘increasingly ... collective ... and collaborative’,
26
 but nothing in the authorship-
based conception of fair use restricts its application to individual authors, romantic or otherwise. 
 
II 
This brings me to what Graeme Austin has called the second face of fair use, copyright 
exceptions that are no longer authorship-oriented, but business model-enabling, fostering not 
new works but redisseminations of content.
27
  Along the way, ‘transformative use’ has itself 
become transformed.  In the context of the Supreme Court’s Campbell decision, the Two Live 
Crew rap parody ‘transformed’ Roy Orbison’s ‘Pretty Woman’ by creating a new (and rather 
raunchy) work.
28
  But courts have come to interpret Campbell’s reference to ‘something new, 
with a further purpose’
29
 to encompass copying that does not add ‘new expression’, so long as 
the copying gives the prior work ‘new meaning’.
30
  Recent cases evidence a drift from 
‘transformative work’ to ‘transformative purpose’; in the latter instance, copying of an entire 
work, without creating a new work, may be excused if the court perceives a sufficient public 
benefit in the appropriation. 
 
In the initial shift from ‘transformative work’ to ‘transformative purpose’ the defendant 
had in fact created an independent work of authorship, even though that work did not 
significantly alter the copied work.  Thus, in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 
(which did not concern digital technologies) the Second Circuit held a coffee-table-book 
biography’s reduced-sized complete images of posters of the legendary rock band The Grateful 
Dead were ‘transformative’ because the book used the images of the posters as ‘historical 
artifacts’ to document the Dead’s concerts, rather than for the posters’ original aesthetic 
purpose.
31
  But the documentary/aesthetic distinction has also significantly expanded the 
application of the fair use exception to new technological uses that do not yield new works.  The 
                                                 
23
 See, e.g., hitlerrantsparodies, Hitler finds out Obama has been re-elected, YOUTUBE (7 Nov. 2012), 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuG1SVLvM6Q; hitlerrantsparodies, Hitler rants about the Hitler Parodies, 
YOUTUBE (1 May 2009), www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqqxRPZdfvs. 
24
 See generally T. Wu, ‘Tolerated Use’, Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts, 31 (2008), 617–35. 
25
 Statistics, HARRY POTTER FAN FICTION, www.harrypotterfanfiction.com (last visited 11 Feb. 2013). 
26
 P. Jaszi, ‘On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity’, Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal, 10 (1992), 302. 
27
 G. Austin, ‘The Two Faces of Fair Use’, New Zealand Universities Law Review, 25 (2012), 288. 
28
 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994). 
29
 Ibid. at 579. 
30
 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2002) (‘By putting a copy of the photograph in 
the newspaper, the work was transformed into news, creating a new meaning or purpose for the work.’). 
31
 448 F.3d 605, 609–10 (2d Cir. 2006). 
7 
 
search engine practice of ‘indexing’ has been the principal digital beneficiary of the 




But other applications of the distinction are emerging.  For example, the constitution of a 
commercial database containing complete copies of copyrighted works may be fair use if the 
database does not exploit the works for their expressive value.
33
  Google has asserted that its 
scanning and retention of millions of copyrighted books is a transformative fair use because 
Google’s responses to user queries seeking bibliographic information or arguably fair use 
“snippets” from the books depends on storing full-text copies in its database.
34
  And the Southern 
District of New York in the recent HathiTrust decision concerning library uses of their holdings, 
as digitized by Google, found the scanning and permanent storage of full copies of in-copyright 
books to further the ‘transformative use’ of allowing ‘data mining’ of the contents of the books.
35
  
Such uses are nonexpressive in two senses: they produce no new expression by the copying and 
storage entities, and the ‘mining’ of the scanned book seeks not to expose its expression, but 
rather to extract information.
36
  For example, in books published between 1980 and 1990 (hence 
in-copyright) the total number of appearances of the word ‘kiwi’.  So stated, characterizing the 
use as ‘fair’ seems to risk no more than spawning some peculiar academic subspecialties.
37
  But 
how many steps between data ‘mining’ and data delivery, with the datum being the whole book? 
 
These new, nonexpressive copyright exceptions rely for justification on the public benefit 
(‘access to culture’) that the redistribution confers, coupled with an absence of economic harm to 
the authors or copyright holders.  Since the new use may create a new market for the work, it 
may not compete directly with the traditional exploitations.  But that is not the point.  Copyright 
traditionally vests in the author the control over new markets for reproductions or public 
communications of their works, including new markets created by new technologies.  When the 
ebook replaces the print volume, copyright will have kept pace with the market; any other rule 
would consign the system to obsolescence. 
 
But new copyright-exploiting businesses would prefer to avoid the expense and 
transaction costs of finding and paying authors, so it’s understandable that the technology 
entrepreneur would seek to portray the author as an impediment to technological progress or to 
access to knowledge, and/or as the undeserving beneficiary of a windfall created by the 
entrepreneur’s ingenuity.
38
  Literary criticism bolsters the unflattering portrait.  The post-
                                                 
32
 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1174–5 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819–20. 
33
 See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 640 (4th Cir. 2009) (‘[T]he archiving of plaintiffs’ 
papers was transformative and favored a finding of “fair use.” iParadigms’ use of these works was completely 
unrelated to expressive content and was instead aimed at detecting and discouraging plagiarism.’). 
34
 Defendant Google, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion for Summary 
Judgment or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication at 21–3, Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 
(DC) (S.D.N.Y. 27 July 2012), 2012 WL 3055772. 
35
 Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV 6351 (HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 10 Oct. 2012). 
36
 See generally Brief of Digital Humanities and Law Scholars as Amici Cuirae in Partial Support of Defendants’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment, HathiTrust, 2012 WL 4808939 (No. 11 CV 6351 (HB)), 2012 WL 3966152. 
37
 See, e.g., ibid. at 8 (describing example of ‘examining word frequencies, syntactic patterns, and thematic markers 
in the metadata-enriched context of author nationality, author gender, and time period’). 
38
 E.g., X. Tang, ‘That Old Thing, Copyright ...; Reconciling the Postmodern Paradox in the New Digital Age’, 
AIPLA Quarterly Journal, 39 (2011), 85 (‘[T]he harm in courts’ tendency to continuously uphold the copyright 
holder’s rights over the defendant user’s extends beyond harsh remedies: it also encourages a litigation-happy trend 
8 
 
modernist attack on the author lends convenient luster and intellectual pedigree to what might 
otherwise seem merely self-serving.  The ‘death of the author’ announced in literary theory has 
produced a syllogism for the heralds of ‘remix culture’: copyright is a consequence of the 
romantic conception of authorship; romantic authorship is dead; therefore, copyright is (or 
should be) dead, too.
39
  Instead, she stalks among the un-dead, for she holds hegemonic sway 
over interpretations, and over markets.  In postmodernism, authors are tyrants, imposing their 
meanings on texts: Michel Foucault pronounced that ‘the author does not precede the works; he 
is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes and chooses; in 
short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, 
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction.’
40
  Transposed to copyright scholarship, the 
romantic author, we learn, is obsolete yet is to blame for the ills of excessive legal protection: 
 
The crystallization of ever-greater legal protections for intellectual property 
occurs around the figure of the originary romantic author, which is ironic because 
increasingly intellectual properties underwrite the ‘private’ sovereignties of 
multinational corporations.  The embedded figure of romantic authorship 
embodied in the trend toward ‘international’ standards of intellectual property 
protection serves ... to legitimate stronger protection ...  Representations of this 
global empire of authorship neglect, or fail to represent at all, alternate models of 




[A]uthors (particularly contemporary authors) are not only given the ability to tax 
the future social product via copyright law but also receive a generous subsidy to 
the extent that they do not have to pay compensation to all of the sources from 
which they have drawn or by which they have been influenced, only some of 




In other words, to borrow a regretted phrase from my reelected president, ‘You didn’t 
create that.’  Your community did.  The ‘authorship empire’ must be stricken back, to liberate 
those ‘alternate models of cultural production’ empowering communities of readers.  Readers 
give meaning to the texts they peruse; reading itself becomes a creative act.  The Internet gives 
concrete effect to the postmodernist theory of the reader as creator, for all readers can 
remanipulate the text, and none can impose unilateral significance.  As another pundit put it: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
on the on the part of copyright owners. This oppressive practice inevitably stops some remix artists from creating (or 
at the very least, using copyrighted material) in the first place.’). 
39
 E.g., K. Aoki, ‘(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship’, 
Stanford Law Review, 48 (1996), 1337 (‘But if all authors to greater or lesser degrees transform and rework 
preexisting materials, then perhaps a too-strong formulation of copyright property would disadvantage future 
authors.’); W. Patry, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 74 
(‘All works of authorship are to some extent communal works; it is therefore inappropriate to vest one person with 
rights that have the ability to impede the birth of future generations of works.’). 
40
 M. Foucault, ‘What Is an Author?’ in J. D. Faubion (ed.), Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology 
(New York, NY: The New Press, 1998), 221. 
41
 Aoki, ‘(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty’, 1305, 1337. 
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Today’s ‘audience’ no longer just passively consumes creative works. Nor are all 
works ‘fixed’ in the sense that they never change once the original author 
produces them.  Rather, the consumer is now often an active participant in the 
creative endeavor, interacting with, and continuously contributing new material to 
creative works.  In fact, consumers may contribute as much creatively to some 




With the increasing Wikipediafication of content, the ‘wisdom of crowds’ overtakes 
individual expertise in the production of works that everyone can pitch in to create, add to, or 
modify.  In the context of copyright, if creativity is so dispersed, then no one can claim to have 
originated a work of authorship, so perhaps no one can fairly own a copyright, either.
43
  We have 
gone beyond opening the gates of traditional fair use to let a thousand writers scribble.  For the 
scribblers’ demand does not fundamentally challenge the ‘authorship empire.’  Rather it just 
multiplies the number of emperors.  Instead, through ‘alternate models of cultural production,’ 
the cumulative and fluctuating nature of creative contributions precludes any individual from 
claiming the work as ‘hers.’  (I point out as an aside that the attack on authorship has made such 
inroads that even some copyright owners have reflexively adopted the rhetoric of anti-
authorship: one of my publishers has taken to addressing me by mail as ‘Dear Content 
Provider’!) 
 
Once the author descends her romantic pedestal to become what I’ll call a ‘techno 
postmodernist participant,’ she can no longer be a ‘proprietor.’  Proprietary authorship is doomed 
to the dustbin of history, for if the rationale for copyright is incentive to produce and distribute 
works, the Internet may belie the Johnsonian calculus that anyone who writes, except for money, 
is a blockhead.
44
  In addition to the poets who burn with inner fire, for whom creation is 
allegedly its own reward, and others (such as law professors) for whom other gainful 
employment permits authorial altruism, we now have those crowdsourcing masses of 
incremental contributors whose participation, whether occasional or obsessive, generates a 
corpus of blockheaded creations. These creators do not need the carrot of exclusive rights in 
order to produce works of authorship.  This is, of course, a very short-sighted view, for (at least 
as to those who aren’t law professors) it describes motivations at a particular point in time.  
Filthy lucre may not have spurred the first endeavor; many new creators hunger for exposure 
over income.  Free distribution can indeed enhance the author’s fame, but if the author cannot 
capitalize on her fame by exploiting her copyrights, then her prospects for future creativity 
decline.  (A starving artist’s garret is still a garret, even if the address is well-known.)  
 
Without exclusive rights, it’s harder to command a price for your work, but according to 
the new orthodoxy, that no longer matters.  Either the work isn’t ‘yours’ anyway, or you 
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shouldn’t be looking to be paid for it.  Along with alternative models of cultural production come 
alternative models of making a living.  The public won’t buy books or music, but we are 
supposed to expect it to retain an inexhaustible appetite for merchandizing properties and concert 
tickets.   
 
That the author should not look to her writings for material sustenance, is not a new idea.  
In the eighteenth-century ‘battle of the booksellers,’ Lord Camden belittled writing for profit: 
 
Glory is the reward of science, [he thundered] and those who deserve it, scorn all 
meaner views ...  It was not for gain, that Bacon, Newton, Milton, Locke, 
instructed and delighted the world; it would be unworthy such men to traffic with 




Given the rise of the professional author in the eighteenth century, this outburst was retrograde 
even its day.  As Catherine Macaulay then wryly observed, the ‘sordid butchers[’] and bakers[’] 





Similarly, author-bashing by the apostles of new media did not come in with the digital 
era, nor with 1970s French intellectuals and their later disciples in the American legal academy.  
For example, as French legal historian Laurent Pfister has demonstrated, the rhetoric 
accompanying the rise of the radio in the 1920s and 1930s seems freshly ripped from a current 
blog.  ‘The moral claims of the community trump the selfish interests of authors who should be 
obliged to abandon their works so that they may be distributed to the collectivity,’ urged a 
representative of the broadcasting industry.
47
  Authors’ property rights reflect a spirit of 
individualism out of step with the times; ‘the author has moral obligations to the society which 
forms the cultural basis for his work.  Society has the right to demand that he contribute his 




Similarly, Graeme Austin has identified the debates over radio broadcasters’ payment of 
performance licenses to composers as a prequel to today’s laments that copyright is thwarting 
technological progress.  Broadcasters testified before a Senate committee that ‘There is no 
greater human blessing that has come into the body politic … than this broadcasting idea as at 
presently conducted … Now … when it gets right down to the basical [sic] issue, [it] is one 
solely between this little group of people and the insiders who control it [ASCAP] and the 
American people.’
49
  Even then, however, some jaundiced commentators observed ‘it is pure 
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Pharisee-ism to claim that [the challenges to exclusive rights] had the goal of spreading 
knowledge of works of authorship; they never had any goal or result other than to allow industry 




It has long been popular to point out that the romantic author has long been a front for 
unromantic, unlovable copyright industries, from the booksellers of the eighteenth century to the 
MPAA and RIAA of today.  For one characteristic overstatement: 
 
From the beginning of modern copyright, we see one of the central rhetorical 
features of copyright discourse – authors put forth as the basis for and 
beneficiaries of rights that are in truth owned by publishers and other corporations 
who regard authors as a negative item on balance sheets to be reduced as much as 
possible. It is a testament to the formidable power of the romantic emotions 
evoked by the metaphor [of authors as parents of their works] that it continues to 





I would like to suggest that today’s counterpart – or antidote? – to the romantic author, 
the techno postmodernist participant, is also a shill for big industry.  The instrumentalization of 
the author, or of the anti-author, still serves big business, it’s just that the business consumes 




To return to the proposition with which I began this essay, ‘more authors depend on 
exceptions to copyright than on exclusive rights,’ I think we can acknowledge that the assertion 
may apply to some of the new universe of creators, those amateur remixers that one commentator 
has dubbed ‘conducers’ – consumer-producers.
52
  Copyright in its technological neutrality and 
indifference to quality welcomes new kinds of creativity, including what Margaret Chon has 
called ‘authorial activity, deriving from broadly participatory technologies, [that] undermines the 
hierarchical and bottleneck control of content suggested by the older, print-based copyright 
constructs of “author.”’
53
  And when those alternative creations build on their predecessors, the 
flexibility of the traditional fair use doctrine will allow their creators to flourish - within the 
noncommercial sphere to which their communitarian altruism should confine them.   
 
But, even in what Margaret Chon has poetically described as ‘an environment filled with 
terabytes rather than trees,’
54
 traditional authors, that is, creators who hope to retain authority 
over the meanings and markets for their works, will also seek to thrive.
55
  This group is 
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composed of more than musty literary luddites clinging to their quill pens; digital denizens can 
feel proprietary about their works, too.  Moreover today’s amateur may become tomorrow’s 
professional, for example as bloggers become novelists or write book-length nonfiction, or 
simply carry on in online endeavors that they succeed in monetizing.  But for their creativity to 
persist, the writing and other creative trades must continue to furnish adequate remuneration.  
Innumerable author blogs attest to conditions too parlous to permit the luxury of unpaid 
intellectual labour.
56
  As my former colleague Jeremy Waldron put it, the author may be dead, 
but she still responds to economic incentives.  Without exclusive, enforceable, rights, she may 
just be dead, that is, otherwise employed. 
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